UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21348
7 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of Israel's military aggression against Iraqi nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

The ninth anniversary of Israel's military aggression against Iraqi nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes falls around this time.

The attack carried out on the evening of 7 June 1981 by several squadrons of Israeli war-planes against the nuclear installations under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Iraq constituted an unprecedented danger to international peace and security. At the time, experts affirmed that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities were tantamount to the wide-scale use of radiological weapons because of the limitless amounts of radiation that such attacks could cause.

Even leaving aside the impact of the raid on the site, its health-related effects, its repercussions for disarmament, its economic consequences and the damage caused to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Israeli military attack represented a grave breach of the entire IAEA safeguards régime, which constitutes the basis of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

During the nine years that have passed since the attack there have been assertions that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, the most significant of which was the statement made in 1986 by Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona, to the British newspaper The Times to the effect that "Israel now possesses operational nuclear weapons". Despite the passage of these long years, Israel still refuses to make even a merely verbal declaration to the international community that it will refrain from any repetition of such an attack against any other nuclear installation.

This refusal reflects the implicit intention if not the explicit desire of Israel to repeat such aggression, and this in turn requires that the Security Council should meet its full responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations by adopting urgent and effective measures to prevent a repetition of such acts of aggression and to ensure that Israel abides by resolution 487 (1981), in which the Council calls upon it urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards.

All the countries of the world are further urged to respect the 1981 General Assembly resolution calling upon all States and institutions which have not yet suspended their co-operation with Israel or their assistance to it in the nuclear field to do so forthwith. Any co-operation in that field with an Israel which persists in refusing to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards will contribute in one way or another to strengthening the nuclear capabilities of that militaristic and adventurist State, thereby exposing the entire Middle East region to greater danger and instability.

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READEX FICHE

If more successful and more effective solutions are to be devised, the international community must take steps on the basis of the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East region and not of one type of weapon alone. To focus on the elimination of only one type of weapon means, in essence, the adoption of a selective approach with regard to the region.

The international community must also act to ensure that all the countries of the region accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, refrain from the development, production, testing or possession of nuclear weapons and from allowing the emplacement of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices in their territory, and place all of their nuclear activities under IAEA supervision.

Such steps must be taken in the framework of a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict in the region to be accompanied by equal access to technology, including nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, for all parties in the region without discrimination and without partiality towards any of the parties to the conflict.

This call, which has obtained wide acceptance in the deliberations of the General Assembly of the United Nations and has received strong support in the region itself, continues to run into reservations and objections from Israel, once again confirming the dangerously aggressive attitude of that entity and the hazards that that attitude poses for international peace and security.

It was on this premise alone that President Saddam Hussein's warning of 1 April last was made that Iraq would exercise its legitimate right to self-defence in response to any aggression launched against it by the Zionist entity.

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S/21349
8 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 4 of Council resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990 on the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). It updates the information regarding the demobilization of members of the Nicaraguan resistance which was contained in my report of 4 June 1990 (S/21341).

2. As indicated in paragraph 9 of that report, the members of the Nicaraguan resistance fall into three groups.

3. The first and largest group consists of the combatants of the "Northern Front" and "Central Front" who have concentrated in security zones 1 to 5 (see S/21274/Add.1, para. 2) and whose demobilization has been the subject of several agreements with the Nicaraguan Government, culminating in the Managua Protocol of 30 May (see S/21341, annex). Since my report of 4 June, there has been a further marked increase in the rate at which this group is being demobilized. In the four days from 4 to 7 June inclusive, the daily rate of demobilization has averaged 703. The Chief Military Observer of ONUCA has reported that the average age of demobilized personnel is around 25, with most of them very close to that age. He has also reported that the weapons handed in can be described, with few exceptions, as being in generally serviceable condition. As of 7 June, 6,538 members of this group had been demobilized since the process began in Nicaragua on 8 May. ONUCA's estimate is that approximately 6,700 remain to be demobilized including several thousand unarmed support personnel. It has been informed by the leadership of the Nicaraguan resistance in the area that a major ceremony will take place on 9 June in security zone 5 at which 2,000 or more combatants will hand over their weapons etc. to ONUCA.

4. The second group are the members of the Nicaraguan resistance belonging to the "Atlantic Front" (Yatama) who are present in security zones 6 and 7 (see S/21274/Add.1, para. 7) and whose demobilization started on 21 May. Their demobilization has proceeded at a less satisfactory pace than that of the main group, largely because of logistic difficulties in concentrating them at demobilization areas in the large security zones concerned. As of 7 June, 305 members of this group had been demobilized. ONUCA estimates that at least another 1,000 are yet to be demobilized.

5. Thirdly, there is the "Southern Front", which was due to resume its talks with the Government on 7 June at El Almendro, in zone 5, with a view to reaching an agreement with the Government on demobilization. However, these talks were postponed until the morning of 8 June.

Observations

6. Although it is doubtful whether it will be possible to complete the process of demobilization by 10 June, it will be clear from the figures in paragraph 3 above that, as far as the "Northern Front" and "Central Front" are concerned, rapid progress has been made during the week that is now ending. The leaders of this group have stated, both in their continuing conversations with the Nicaraguan Government and in public, that demobilization is an irreversible process and that they will honour the commitments which they have entered into. In these circumstances, the Nicaraguan Government has indicated its wish that I should recommend to the Security Council that that part of ONUCA's mandate which is related to monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces and demobilizing the members of the Nicaraguan resistance should not be allowed to lapse on 10 June but should be extended for a sufficient period to permit demobilization to be completed (a period which the Nicaraguan Government estimates at between two and three weeks).

7. The situation regarding the "Atlantic Front" and "Southern Front" is less clear and less satisfactory. In the former case, demobilization has proceeded slowly and in the latter it has not yet begun. However, the combatants in these two groups are much fewer than those in the main group and if their demobilization can now proceed rapidly, it should be possible to complete it not later than the demobilization of the main group.

8. I believe that, in these circumstances, it would be appropriate for the Security Council to authorize an extension of the relevant part of ONUCA's mandate for a brief and clearly defined period. This will be in accordance with the wish of the Nicaraguan Government. It will also correspond with my own conviction that it would be a mistake for ONUCA, which has played such a central part in making demobilization possible, to be withdrawn when the work is now on the whole proceeding rapidly and its completion is within reach.

9. As reported above, the Nicaraguan Government believes that a further two to three weeks will be needed to complete demobilization. The time required for this is, of course, the critical factor determining the period for which the mandate should be extended. It will depend to an important extent on how many combatants remain to be demobilized after the ceremony planned for 9 June. It will also depend on how those combatants are distributed between the five security zones.

10. If the major demobilization in security zone 5 on 9 June takes place on the scale expected, the numbers remaining to be demobilized should be such as to permit completion of the process within 10 days or so. But, given the inevitable uncertainties, the Security Council may think it right to allow some flexibility and to authorize the extension of the relevant parts of ONUCA's mandate for a period of up to 19 days, that is until 29 June 1990. On this basis, I would instruct the Chief Military Observer to deploy the military personnel available to

him in a flexible manner in order to ensure the earliest possible completion of demobilization. He would also be instructed to repatriate the Venezuelan battalion, company by company, at the earliest dates permitted by the evolution of the task entrusted to it. I would also, on the Security Council's behalf, draw the Nicaraguan Government's attention to the fact that this part of ONUCA's mandate will terminate not later than 29 June and urge it to ensure that demobilization of the combatants of the "Atlantic Front" and "Southern Front" is completed before that date.

11. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council decide to extend that part of ONUCA's mandate which is related to monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces and demobilizing the members of the Nicaraguan resistance for a period not exceeding 19 days from 10 June 1990, that is until 29 June 1990 at the latest.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/21350
8 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 654 (1990) of 4 May 1990 and the statement made by the President of the Security Council on its behalf on 23 May 1990 (S/21331), concerning the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA),

Expressing its concern that the process of demobilization has not yet been fully completed, although progress is now being made after the removal of obstacles that prevented the conclusion of the demobilization process on 10 June 1990, as stipulated in resolution 654 (1990) of the Security Council,

Having studied the report submitted by the Secretary-General on 4 June 1990 (S/21341) as well as his statement of 8 June to the members of the Council (S/21349),

1. Decides that ONUCA's tasks of monitoring the cease-fire and separation of forces in Nicaragua and demobilizing members of the Nicaraguan resistance shall be extended, on the understanding, as recommended by the Secretary-General, that these tasks will lapse with the completion of the demobilization process not later than 29 June 1990;

2. Urges all those directly involved in the demobilization process to take all necessary measures to maintain and, if possible, increase the rate of demobilization so as to complete it, at the latest, on the date specified in paragraph 1 above;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments and in particular to report to the Council not later than 29 June concerning the completion of the demobilization process.

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S/21351
11 June 1990
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
AND SPANISH

LETTER DATED 31 MAY 1990 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, CONTAINING A FURTHER APPEAL FOR VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

I have the honour to write to you about the financial situation of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The preoccupation I have repeatedly expressed in this regard is very much shared by the Governments of the troop-contributing countries, whose own continued grave concern at the growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account was again expressed recently in the letter which they jointly addressed to me on 10 May 1990 (S/21294).

You will recall that, when it established UNFICYP in 1964, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to accept voluntary contributions towards meeting the costs of the Force. Despite repeated appeals, receipts from such contributions continue to fall far short of the expenditures for which the United Nations is responsible, even though the Organization's share is but a fraction of the total cost of maintaining UNFICYP. I am annexing a detailed presentation of the current financial situation.

As at 30 April 1990, the accumulated shortfall in the UNFICYP Special Account had reached $179.3 million for the mandate periods ending 15 June 1990. As regards the current period, only $2.4 million has been pledged or received against projected expenditures estimated at $13.8 million. As you know, the burden of the serious deficit in the Force's account falls entirely on the handful of troop-contributing countries which are already absorbing over 70 per cent of the costs through their provision of contingents and whose claims the United Nations has been able to meet only up to December 1980. This places an unacceptable and wholly unfair financial burden on the Governments concerned.

The vital peace-keeping role of UNFICYP has been unanimously emphasized by the Security Council time and again. The Force has made, and continues to make, an indispensable contribution to international peace and security and to maintaining calm in Cyprus, a condition which is essential to my ongoing efforts to bring about a political settlement.

Given the important role played by UNFICYP and the increasingly precarious financial situation in which it finds itself, I should be most grateful if you could convey to your Government my deep concern about this situation and my urgent appeal for a voluntary financial contribution. It is my hope that your Government will find it possible to respond generously to this appeal, so as to enable UNFICYP to continue to carry out the functions for which it was established.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ de CUELLAR

Annex

Financing and financial position of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus

In accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) on the establishment of UNFICYP, the costs of the Force are being met by the Governments providing the contingents and by voluntary contributions received for this purpose by the United Nations. In addition, the Government of Cyprus provides, at no cost to the United Nations, areas for the headquarters, camps and other premises of UNFICYP.

Under existing arrangements, the troop-contributing Governments make available to the United Nations troops whose regular pay and allowances and normal matériel expenses they have agreed to pay themselves. In addition, these Governments have agreed to finance at their own expense, as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus, certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP. Both these cost elements currently amount to some $32.8 million for each six-month period. They represent some 70.4 per cent of the total cost of maintaining UNFICYP.

The United Nations is responsible for financing entirely through voluntary contributions received from Governments (a) the operational expenditures (i.e. administrative and logistic support) incurred by UNFICYP and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs incurred by the troop-contributing Governments for which they seek reimbursement. These expenditures amount to some $13.8 million for the six-month period ending 15 June 1990.

The cost of financing the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the six-month period ending 15 June 1990 is estimated, therefore, at some $46.6 million.

Since 1964, 77 countries have provided voluntary financial support to UNFICYP totalling approximately $426.4 million. However, the contributions received for each extension period have consistently fallen short of the amount required to meet the direct costs of the Force for which the United Nations is responsible. As a result, the shortfall in the UNFICYP Special Account as at 30 April 1990 for the mandate periods ending 15 June 1990 is estimated at $179.3 million. The status of contributions received for the latest four mandate periods is shown in the attached table.

STATUS OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE LATEST FOUR MANDATE PERIODS AS AT 30 APRIL 1990

(In United States dollars equivalent)

Country	54th 16/06/88 to 15/12/88	55th 16/12/88 to 15/06/89	56th 16/06/89 to 15/12/89	57th 16/12/89 to 15/06/90
Antigua and Barbuda	-	250	250	-
Australia a/	50 000	50 000	50 000	-
Austria a/, b/	125 000	125 000	125 000	-
Bahamas	1 000	500	500	-
Barbados	500	-	-	-
Belguim	141 401	121 755	121 756	-
Canada a/	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	375 000	387 500	387 500	400 000
Denmark a/, b/	122 113	122 113	-	-
Finland a/	-	-	-	-
France	-	86 435	86 435	-
Germany, Federal Republic of	821 966	764 393	764 394	822 589
Greece	400 000	400 000	400 000	400 000
Iceland	4 520	4 394	4 394	-
India	5 000	-	-	-
Ireland a/	-	-	-	-
Italy	200 000	200 000	-	-
Jamaica	500	500	500	-
Japan	200 000	200 000	200 000	-
Luxembourg	3 988	4 143	4 143	-
Malaysia	-	2 500	2 500	-
Malta	-	-	-	500
Nigeria	1 250	-	-	-
Norway	305 000	305 000	305 000	-
Pakistan	1 500	1 500	1 500	-
Philippines	-	1 804	1 804	-
Spain	44 522	65 268	65 269	84 033
Sweden a/, b/	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	616 166	632 911	632 911	671 141
Thailand	-	1 000	-	-

Country	54th 16/06/88 to 15/12/88	55th 16/12/88 to 15/06/89	56th 16/06/89 to 15/12/89	57th 16/12/89 to 15/06/90
Togo	-	1 572	-	-
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland a/, b/	1 533 254	847 583	-	-
United States of America	4 500 000	2 812 000	4 500 000	-
Uruguay	1 000	1 000	1 000	-
Venezuela	2 500	2 500	2 500	2 500
Zaire	-	1 000	1 000	-
Others	-	2 404	2 403	-
Total	9 456 180	7 145 025	7 660 759	2 380 763

a/ Indicates troop-contributing Governments. Indicative figures over a six-month period of the costs absorbed for providing contingents are as follows: Australia, $500,000; Austria, $1.9 million; Canada, $10.7 million; Denmark, $650,000; Ireland, $64,000; and United Kingdom, $19 million.

b/ Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of costs.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 6 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a copy of a message dated 22 May 1990 from Mr. Václav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to Mr. Chedli Klibi, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

I would be most grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly session, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eduard KUKAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Message dated 22 May 1990 from the President of Czechoslovakia to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

Let me thank you for the letter you sent me towards the end of April which I received before my state visit to Israel. You will know that Czechoslovakia decided in February last to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Similar decisions have been taken or are likely to be taken soon also by other Eastern European countries that, after decades of oppression, have now set out along the path of freedom and democracy. My own country, in so doing, is following up on its earlier long-standing traditional friendship with Israel and the Jewish people. The past forced severance of diplomatic relations has always been regarded by our people as an unwise and foresightless action.

This, however, does certainly not mean that we would intend to make a complete volte-face in our foreign policy orientation in respect of the Middle East. From now on we wish to pursue a balanced policy both towards the Arab countries and towards Israel. We want to obtain a better knowledge of, and deeper insight into, all the world. We also want to maintain our traditional friendly relations with the Arab nations, including the Palestinian people.

It was with this end in view that I conducted in Israel and before that in Prague talks with the widest possible spectrum of the Israeli political circles in the course of which we always spent most of the time discussing the possibilities of making peace in the Middle East rather than - as one might expect - talking about our bilateral relationship. The latter's further development namely depends, in my opinion, on the attainment of peace in the region which is bound to come one day.

It was for the same reason that I invited Yasser Arafat to Prague and met in East Jerusalem with representatives of Palestinian political circles. I have tried to arrange also a brief meeting with President Mubarak of Egypt but we have been unable so far to find a convenient date.

I am well aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East. It will take extensive joint efforts and a substantial amount of time to resolve all the accumulated problems. Yet, a number of issues should be tackled immediately. With this in mind, I have, for example, appealed to Israeli officials to reopen universities in the occupied territories. I have protested and I shall protest again if I learn about violence and violations of the human rights of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. Many times, both during my visit to Israel and in Prague, I have made statements to the effect that the Palestinians have to be granted the right to a home and that it is necessary to open dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians for which the so-called Baker Plan might serve as a good starting point.

On the other hand, however, I am convinced that - even with Yasser Arafat's commendable efforts in this direction - a certain step to this end should be made by the Arab side, too. It might consist, for example, in taking up a new position

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on the United Nations resolution of 1975, mentioned in your letter, which likened zionism to racism. Personally, I cannot agree with the wording of that resolution as what it says is not true. By the same token, it is my opinion that the recent statements by the President of Iraq are not conducive towards peaceful settlement in the Middle East either.

You have also stated that Israel - in connection with the influx of Jews from the Soviet Union - is wilfully changing the demographic structure of the population in the occupied territories. This is an extremely sensitive issue relating both to the vital interests of the Palestinians and to the Israeli policy as has been pursued until now. Let me explain our attitude to this matter in a few words. Like other Eastern European countries, we, too, have been repeatedly asked to participate in the transit of Soviet Jews to Israel. In this connection, I have many times emphasized that we recognize everyone's right to emigration from any country as well as everyone's right to settle in any country and that it is our moral obligation to promote this right. Yet, I have also stressed a number of times that we are categorically opposed to any forced demographic changes, especially in occupied territories. Thus, it is our opinion that if we were to assist in the transit of the Soviet Jews our assistance should be accompanied by guarantees provided by the Israeli Government that the new immigrants would not be settled in the occupied territories.

I know that all these problems will be discussed at the forthcoming summit of the Arab countries. I also know that the atmosphere of your talks may be affected by the recent tragic multiple killing and the new wave of violence that has risen as a consequence thereof in Israel and particularly in Gaza. Nevertheless, I want to firmly believe that the Arab summit will become one of the momentous events that will guide your peoples and the people of Israel towards peace with, and respect for, one another which is the only possible solution to the crisis in that part of the world. From the bottom of my heart, I wish your talks success.

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LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire provisions.

1. At 1500 hours on 11 May 1990, the Iranians built an observation post at co-ordinates 566198, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

2. On 11 May 1990, for the eleventh consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing four dump trucks, two excavators and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage rampart in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

3. At 0845 hours on 11 May 1990, eight Iranians were seen constructing a shelter of sandbags at co-ordinates 612633, 3,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

4. At 0845 hours on 11 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks, an excavator and a bulldozer was seen improving defensive positions in the Curve area at co-ordinates 588717, 1,800 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

5. At 0730 hours on 11 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of seven dump trucks, an excavator and a grader was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 66157, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

6. At 1000 hours on 11 May 1990, an Iranian excavator was seen raising the level of the embankment at co-ordinates 308600, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

7. At 1300 hours on 11 May 1990, three Iranian boats were seen each carrying two Iranian forces personnel at co-ordinates 709139, 1,700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

8. At 1130 hours on 12 May 1990, 10 Iranians proceeded to dig a 20-metre-long communications trench west of Tit Ya'in at co-ordinates 345831, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

9. At 0810 hours on 12 May 1990, 12 Iranians built seven positions on the first embankment at co-ordinates 929309, 2,900 metres from our III Army Corps units.

10. On 12 May 1990, for the twelfth consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing five dump trucks, two excavators and a bulldozer, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 588599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

11. At 1200 hours on 12 May 1990, the Iranians set up a light machine-gun at co-ordinates 547250, 850 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

12. At 1030 hours on 12 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks and a grader was seen repairing the earth rampart at co-ordinates 235721, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1130 hours on 12 May 1990, a group of Iranians built three positions of sandbags at co-ordinates 365596, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

14. At 1840 hours on 12 May 1990, eight groups of Iranians, each consisting of 10 men, built guard posts at co-ordinates 387584, 388583, 389586, 390581, 419546, 418548 and 423542, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

15. At 1930 hours on 12 May 1990, a group of Iranians, estimated to number 20, was seen building three guard posts of sandbags at co-ordinates 325569, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

16. At 1045 hours on 13 May 1990, the Iranians pitched two tents on hill 2039 at co-ordinates 737642, 1,800 metres from our I Army Corps units.

17. At 0910 hours on 13 May 1990, the Iranians dug slit trenches in the Iranian rampart at co-ordinates 924954 and 929935, 2,600 metres from our III Army Corps units.

18. At 1650 hours on 13 May 1990, two Iranian dump trucks were seen stopping behind the first embankment at co-ordinates 926850, 700 metres from our III Army Corps units. One of the trucks lowered two boats into the flood waters in no man's land, and the other lowered 50 iron sections.

19. At 1300 hours on 13 May 1990, the Iranians set up a single-barrel machine-gun on the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 628864, 1,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

20. At 1730 hours on 13 May 1990, 20 Iranians, one of them wearing a turban, alighted from six vehicles and proceeded to observe our units at co-ordinates 990743, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

21. At 1800 hours on 13 May 1990, four Iranian vehicles, each carrying eight men were seen approaching from the rear and halting behind the first embankment, where they proceeded to observe our units, at co-ordinates 947838, 2,000 metres from our III Army Corps units.

22. At 1830 hours on 13 May 1990, eight Iranian vehicles were seen approaching from the rear and halting behind the first embankment at co-ordinates 928846, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units. Sixty men alighted, one of them wearing a turban and another carrying a wireless set, and they proceeded to observe our units through field-glasses from the first embankment.

23. At 0830 hours on 13 May 1990, seven Iranians were observed building a hut of mud east of Musian at co-ordinates 255004, 1,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

24. At 1700 hours on 13 May 1990, a group of Iranians, estimated to number 25, built three shelters at co-ordinates 608632 and 608630, 5,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

25. On 13 May 1990, for the thirteenth consecutive day, the Iranians were still continuing the operations of the engineering unit on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

26. At 1350 hours on 13 May 1990, the Iranians built a new single-barrel machine-gun position at co-ordinates 592622, 4,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

27. At 0800 hours on 13 May 1990, five small Iranian boats were seen at co-ordinates 739110, 5,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

28. At 1600 hours on 13 May 1990, four Iranians were seen swimming in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 545258, 650 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

29. At 1730 hours on 13 May 1990, nine dump trucks were seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 621168, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

30. At 1000 hours on 13 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two dump trucks, a bulldozer, two rollers and a tanker truck was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 276696, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

31. At 1040 hours on 13 May 1990, three groups of Iranians, each consisting of 10 men, built three guard posts at co-ordinates 401568, 403566 and 417549, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

32. At 1200 hours on 13 May 1990, a number of Iranians were seen building 12 guard posts, the first, in which a medium-sized machine-gun was set up, at co-ordinates 358597 and the others at co-ordinates 365595, 355595, 362595, 359599, 363595, 364595, 366595, 367595, 368595 and 371595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

33. At 1800 hours on 13 May 1990, 12 Iranians were seen building four positions of sandbags, at 10-metre intervals, at co-ordinates 308598, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

34. At 1950 hours on 13 May 1990, a group of Iranians was seen building scattered positions of sandbags, at 100-metre intervals, eight between co-ordinates 319569

and 315574, eight between co-ordinates 330572 and 333573 and five between co-ordinates 343582 and 344584. An unroofed SPG-9 gun position was built at co-ordinates 333573, 600 to 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

35. At 1500 hours on 13 May 1990, the Iranians set up a double-barrel machine-gun on the first embankment at co-ordinates 943818, 600 metres from our III Army Corps units.

36. At 1715 hours on 13 May 1990 and at 0900 hours on 14 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit was seen improving the defensive position at co-ordinates 582721 and 588717, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

37. At 1000 hours on 14 May 1990, the Iranians dug a 30-metre-long section of communications trench around the Iranian mound located on the left slope of hill 2039 at co-ordinates 737642, 3,000 metres from our I Army Corps units, so that the total length of the trench was 39 metres.

38. On 14 May 1990, the Iranians moved the tents in the camp that they had set up at the Dukan garrison on 24 April 1990, as we informed you in our letter on Iranian violations for the period 20 to 30 April 1990, to the area of hill 2337 at co-ordinates 388914, 8,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

39. On 14 May 1990, for the fourteenth consecutive day, the Iranians were still continuing the operations of the engineering unit on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

40. At 0800 hours on 14 May 1990, eight Iranian vehicles were seen building a road at co-ordinates 563203, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

41. At 1020 hours on 14 May 1990, three Iranian boats carrying two to three Iranians were seen at co-ordinates 707136, 1,600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

42. At 0800 hours on 14 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks, a bulldozer, a roller and a tanker truck was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 367595, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

43. At 0840 hours on 14 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks and a grader was seen repairing the forward embankment at co-ordinates 235721, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

44. At 0855 hours on 14 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two rollers, a bulldozer, a grader and a tanker truck was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 276695, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

45. At 0920 hours on 14 May 1990, the Iranians set up a BKC machine-gun at co-ordinates 230572, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

46. At 1000 hours on 14 May 1990, the Iranians set up three positions of sandbags on the forward embankment at co-ordinates 308588, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

47. At 0950 hours on 15 May 1990, 13 Iranians were seen digging a 35-metre-long communications trench around the Iranian headquarters north of hill 1756 at co-ordinates 718649, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

48. At 1015 hours on 15 May 1990, four Iranians dug an 80-metre-long communications trench inside their positions south of Kuhinah at co-ordinates 567939, 1,400 metres from our II Army Corps units.

49. On 15 May 1990, the Iranians set up a 7.6-metre-high iron tower at co-ordinates 939283, 3,700 metres from our III Army Corps units.

50. On 15 May 1990, for the fifteenth consecutive day, the operations of the Iranian engineering unit consisting of 10 dump trucks, two excavators, and two bulldozers continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 585599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units. The unit began transporting earth to co-ordinates 594614.

51. At 1745 hours on 15 May 1990, an Iranian aircraft was seen landing at co-ordinates 7015, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units. At 1830 hours, it took off in the direction of the rear.

52. At 1155 hours on 15 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of six dump trucks and two excavators were seen topping the rampart at co-ordinates 335574, 400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

53. At 1930 hours on 15 May 1990, the Iranians set up a double-barrel machine-gun on the second Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 950803, 1,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

54. At 1600 hours on 15 May 1990, an Iranian force, estimated at platoon strength, approached the Barzin area and, at 1630 hours, halted at co-ordinates 982670 and began to build positions at co-ordinates 007672 and 982666. Four persons were also seen on the summit of Barzin. This occurred 2,000 to 3,500 metres from our V Army Corps units.

55. At 1630 hours on 15 May 1990, a hoist in the Curve area set up triangular concrete sections and arranged them in the form of shelters at co-ordinates 581722, 1,300 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

56. At 0950 hours on 16 May 1990, 13 Iranians dug a 35-metre-long section of slit trench around the Iranian headquarters north of hill 1756, at co-ordinates 718649, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units. The completed work measured 35 metres, so that the total length of the trench was 70 metres.

57. At 0940 hours on 16 May 1990, the Iranians dug a 4-metre-long and 1-metre-wide communications trench on the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 944818, 700 metres from our III Army Corps units.

58. At 1140 hours on 16 May 1990, the Iranians set up two megaphones behind the first Iranian dam, 15 metres apart, at co-ordinates 934839, 700 metres from our III Army Corps units.

59. At 1140 hours on 16 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit was seen topping the road leading to Iranian monitoring post No. 1 in front of the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 993729, 600 metres from our III Army Corps units.

60. On 16 May 1990, for the sixteenth consecutive day, the operations of the Iranian engineering unit consisting of seven dump trucks and an excavator continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 585599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

61. At 0730 hours on 16 May 1990, six Iranian dump trucks proceeded to strengthen the embankment at co-ordinates 615171, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

62. At 1030 hours on 16 May 1990, the Iranians built two firing positions of blocks at co-ordinates 229720, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

63. At 1715 hours on 16 May 1990, the Iranians set up a BKC machine-gun at the Iranian monitoring post at co-ordinates 943807, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

64. At 0810 hours on 16 May 1990, a forklift was seen in the Curve area moving concrete sections from the vicinity of the concrete shelters to the left of the iron tower, while, at the same time, two electricity poles were set up to the left of the tower, at co-ordinates 588717, 2,500 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

65. At 0930 hours on 17 May 1990, the Iranians dug an iron shelter near Makhfar Sarcheh, roofed it at ground level and placed ammunition crates in it. At the same time, the Iranians dug another shelter 10 metres from the above-mentioned one. This occurred at co-ordinates 983477, 3,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

66. At 1100 hours on 17 May 1990, the Iranians built a new firing post at co-ordinates 928849, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

67. At 1115 hours on 17 May 1990, the Iranians built a 90-centimetre-high machine-gun position of sandbags on the Iranian observation post in the Curve area at co-ordinates 584721, 1,800 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

68. On 17 May 1990, for the seventeenth consecutive day, the operations of the Iranian engineering unit continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 585599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

69. At 1600 hours on 17 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of three dump trucks and an excavator was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 669155, 1,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

70. At 1930 hours on 17 May 1990, 30 to 40 Iranians built 10 positions at co-ordinates 346586, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

71. At 1745 hours on 17 May 1990, an Iranian excavator was seen building an earth embankment parallel to the road east of Mashakh Ushkut at co-ordinates 734648, 2,300 metres from our I Army Corps units. The completed work measures 30 metres in length and 2 metres in height.

72. At 1750 hours on 17 May 1990, the Iranians set up a BKC machine-gun at the Iranian monitoring post in front of the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 943811, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

73. At 1100 hours on 17 May 1990, 20 Iranians were seen digging firing positions on the Iranian rampart at co-ordinates 299641, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

74. At 1000 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians set up a double-barrel machine-gun on the Iranian rampart at co-ordinates 929889, 1,750 metres from our III Army Corps units.

75. On 18 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit built an embankment extending from co-ordinates 998729 to the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 998735, 300 to 400 metres from our III Army Corps units. In addition, the Iranians had proceeded, with an earlier engineering unit, to build an embankment extending from the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 995726 in the direction of the village of Shisheh at co-ordinates 996727. The Iranians, through the international observers, refused to desist from the work and insisted on continuing it until it was completed.

76. At 0900 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians set up a double-barrel anti-aircraft machine-gun on the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 929309, 3,150 metres from our III Army Corps units.

77. At 1000 hours on 18 May 1990, a group of Iranians, estimated to number six, were seen digging firing positions on the earth dam parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 299641, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

78. At 1030 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians built a reed hut on the rampart parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 308591, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

79. At 1230 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians dug firing positions, at 100-metre intervals, on the earth rampart parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 284689, 286689, 285689 and 287689, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

80. At 1910 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians built three 1-metre-square positions of sandbags, at 100-metre intervals, on the earth dam parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 303633, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

81. At 1930 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians built five 1-metre-square positions of sandbags, at 200-metre intervals, on the earth rampart parallel to the Shatt al-Arab in front of Hajj Salbukh island at co-ordinates 308602, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

82. At 1450 hours on 18 May 1990, 15 persons in a Land Cruiser automobile were seen pitching three 180-pound tents north of hill 810 at co-ordinates 774595, 1,250 metres from our I Army Corps units.

83. At 2400 hours on 18 May 1990, the Iranians, with a force of 20 to 25 men, seized hill 3226 at co-ordinates 971681 and 968689, 800 metres from our V Army Corps units. It was seized by the Iranians once before last summer.

84. At 0945 hours on 19 May 1990, the Iranian excavator resumed work on the earth embankment at co-ordinates 734648, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units. The completed work measures 55 metres in length and 1.5 metres in height.

85. At 1100 hours on 19 May 1990, an Iranian boat was seen carrying a BKC machine-gun and four Iranians, one of them carrying field-glasses, set off from co-ordinates 593613, halted at co-ordinates 570591 and returned directly to its point of departure, 200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

86. On 19 May 1990, the Iranian engineering unit consisting of nine dump trucks, two excavators and two bulldozers were still continuing to operate on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 585599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

87. At 0700 hours on 19 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a grader and five dump trucks proceeded to strengthen an embankment at co-ordinates 671158, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

88. At 1130 hours on 19 May 1990, a khaki-coloured helicopter was observed landing opposite the pipeline overpass area and taking off at 1258 hours at co-ordinates 671162, 2,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

89. At 0900 hours on 19 May 1990, the Iranians were working on the circular positions of sandbags mentioned in paragraph 79 of this letter.

90. At 1920 hours on 19 May 1990, the Iranians built eight positions, at 100-metre intervals, on the Iranian embankment parallel to the Shatt al-Arab, from co-ordinates 429542 to 420546, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

91. At 1850 hours on 19 May 1990, an Iranian Poclain excavator was seen digging a slit trench in the middle of the first Iranian embankment 30 metres long at co-ordinates 944816, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

92. At 0900 hours on 20 May 1990, nine Iranians built a new shelter north of Tit Ya'in at co-ordinates 375834, 2,600 metres from our I Army Corps units.

93. At 0940 hours on 20 May 1990, a group of Iranians wearing Kurdish dress proceeded to build dwelling-houses in the village of Miskiyah at co-ordinates 368845 and in the village of Khaki Ashqan at co-ordinates 346864, 4,000 to 5,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

94. At 0730 hours on 20 May 1990, an Iranian bulldozer built a 1.5-metre-high and 25-metre-long embankment at the Iranian mound north-east of Tirkat Jarr at co-ordinates 577818, 2,400 metres from our I Army Corps units.

95. On 20 May 1990, the Iranian engineering unit consisting of seven dump trucks and other equipment was still building the embankment at co-ordinates 998728 in the direction of co-ordinates 998735, 300 to 400 metres from our III Army Corps units.

96. At 1015 hours on 20 May 1990, four Iranians proceeded to improve the Iranian machine-gun positions to the right of the Iranian observation post in the Curve area at co-ordinates 588717, 1,800 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

97. On 20 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of nine dump trucks, two excavators and two dump trucks continued to operate on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 585599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

98. At 0800 hours on 20 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer, a grader, 12 dump trucks and two rollers was seen mending the road at co-ordinates 511325, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

99. At 1755 hours on 20 May 1990, a hoist was seen lowering eight quadrangular concrete shelter sections 2 metres high and 1 metre wide at co-ordinates 305112, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

100. At 1920 hours on 20 May 1990, a Faun dump truck was seen carrying five 2-metre-wide and 2-metre-long semicircular concrete shelter sections, which were lowered by a fork-lift to the rear of the Iranian embankment, at co-ordinates 415554, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps units opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

101. 11 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-125 centimetres.

102. 12 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

103. 13 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 15-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

104. 14 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 15-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-125 centimetres.

105. 15 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 15-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 7-120 centimetres.

106. 16 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 5-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

107. 17 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 5-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

108. 18 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

109. 19 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

110. 20 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-145 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-120 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21354
12 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 24 May 1990 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China stating that Mr. Li Daoyu has been appointed representative of China on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/45/310
S/21355
12 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC/ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 23, 25, 35, 46, 71, 82
and 144 of the preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROLONGATION OF THE
ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 12 June 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i., of the Permanent Mission of Oman to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a press communiqué, in Arabic, dated 4 June 1990, issued by the thirty-fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Co-operation Council held at Taif, Saudi Arabia, under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Mr. Yousef Bin Alawi Bin Abdullah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 25, 35, 46, 71, 82 and 144 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Izzat Bin Sabeel AL-ZADGALY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/45/50.

ANNEX

Press communiqué issued at Taif, Saudi Arabia, on 4 June 1990 by the thirty-fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Co-operation Council

The Ministerial Council held its thirty-fifth session at Taif, Saudi Arabia, on 11 Dhu'lqa'dah A.H. 1410 (4 June A.D. 1990), under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Yousef Bin Alawi Bin Abdullah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman and Chairman of the current session, with all its members present.

In accordance with the directives of Their Majesties and Their Highnesses the leaders of the States of the Council and drawing inspiration from the principles embodied in the resolutions of the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council recalled the important resolutions of the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad and the Final Statement adopted by it on 30 May 1990. It studied the positive results achieved by the Summit Conference and commended the fraternal and constructive spirit that characterized the Conference and the clear resolve to eliminate causes of division and to achieve Arab solidarity, which was the basis of joint Arab endeavour and the source of Arab strength in dealing with regional and international challenges.

In this context, the Council expressed its congratulations on the occasion of the establishment of the Republic of Yemen, which realized the Yemeni people's desire for unity. It expressed its backing and support for this unity, in the hope that this step would contribute to the realization of the aspirations of the fraternal Yemeni people for progress and prosperity in such a way as to ensure peace and security in the region.

The Council reviewed the situation in the Gulf region and the developments in contacts with a view to the implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). The Council commended the initiative of Mr. Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq, in addressing direct messages to the Iranian President. The Council considered that Iranian responsiveness would assist in preparing a positive climate for the commencement of direct negotiations between the two parties to deal with problems and implement the principles embodied in Security Council resolution 598 (1987). In the light of that, the Council reaffirmed its support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Council reviewed the situation in the occupied Arab territories and the developments in the intifadah in the light of the resolutions of the Extraordinary Summit Conference. With guidance from the principles laid down by Their Majesties and Their Highnesses and represented in the resolutions of the Supreme Council at its last session, the Council expressed its condemnation of the inhumane Zionist policy aimed at liquidating the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the establishment of its independent State, and the use of violent means and torture in opposing the resolve of this people to exercise its legitimate right to eliminate all traces of the occupation, free itself from its bonds and establish its independent State.

The Council renewed its support for the struggle of the Palestinian people until such time as it was able to arrive at a solution that met its aspirations, accorded with its resolve and realized its will. The Council expressed profound regret that the United States of America should have resorted to the veto in order to prevent the Security Council from sending a mission to engage in fact-finding and provide the necessary protection for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

The Council also reviewed the situation in Lebanon and affirmed the statements made in that regard by the recent Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference in Baghdad. It expressed profound regret at the bloody events that had taken place in Lebanon and its deep sympathy with the suffering of the Lebanese people. It called upon the people of Lebanon to exercise restraint and to put an end to the fighting, halt the violence and avoid anything that might obstruct the course of recovery, reconciliation and peace by rallying under the legitimate banner in order to end the tragedy and ensure the return of peace and stability to fraternal Lebanon. It stressed that its support for the legitimate Lebanese authority would continue, that the Taif Agreement was the appropriate framework for safeguarding the interests of all Lebanese without exception and that it represented the way in which Lebanon could be extricated from the vortex of violence and peace and security achieved.

The Ministerial Council commended the efforts of the High-level Tripartite Committee and called upon it to continue to make further efforts until its goals for Lebanon's recovery of its unity and independence and the extension of the authority and sovereignty of the Lebanese State to all Lebanese territory were achieved.

The Council took note of the developments in the negotiations between the States of the Gulf Co-operation Council and the European Economic Community and of the recommendations of the Financial and Economic Co-operation Committee. In the light of the joint meeting held by the Ministerial Council and the Financial and Economic Co-operation Committee on Sunday, 10 Dhu'lqa'dah A.H. 1410 (3 June 1990), and proceeding from the decision of the Supreme Council to authorize the Ministerial Council to pursue the negotiations, the Council decided that official negotiations with the European Economic Community should begin and that the Secretary-General and the negotiating team should be authorized to take the necessary steps to that end.

The Council decided to hold another meeting with the Financial and Economic Co-operation Committee on Sunday, 13 Safar A.H. 1411 (2 September A.D. 1990) to continue consideration of the question of the negotiations.

The Council also took note of the minutes of the various Ministerial Committees and adopted appropriate decisions concerning them.

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL

A/45/311
S/21356
13 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 23, 35 and 77 of the
preliminary list*
QUESTION OF PALESTINE
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES
AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER
ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 12 June 1990 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am instructed by the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which has the powers and responsibilities of the Provisional Government of Palestine, to bring the following to your immediate attention:

Israel, the occupying Power, remains persistent in its acts of violence and terror against the Palestinians living in the occupied Palestinian territory, sparing no one from its brutal aggression, be they little children or even the unborn.

On 12 June 1990, the infamous Israeli military attacked Al Shati Camp in Gaza, bombarding its homes with poisonous tear gas, resulting in the injury (tear gas related) of 50 Palestinian children, who were admitted to Al Shiffa hospital, and the miscarriage of two pregnant women, Naimeh Abu Shabab, 30 years old, of Khan Younis, who miscarried in her second month of pregnancy, and Mariam Abu Dheir, 28 years old, of Rafah, who miscarried in her third month of pregnancy (also tear gas related).

* A/45/50.

This situation should no longer be tolerated. Israel's aggression and belligerent violations of human rights should be stopped by the international community immediately.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 23, 35 and 77 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Zuhdi Labib TERZI
Permanent Observer of
Palestine to the
United Nations

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21357
15 June 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1990 (S/21340 and Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 June 1990,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 December 1990;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 30 November 1990;

3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

90-15114 1655e (E)

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21358
15 June 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1990 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Unified Command established pursuant to Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950, I have the honour to submit a report of the United Nations Command concerning the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 1/ during the period from 1 January to 31 December 1989. I also submit a special report of the United Nations Command on the North Korean construction of another infiltration tunnel across the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed reports of the United Nations Command, be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. James WILKINSON
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

Annex I

Report on the activities of the United Nations Command, 1989

I. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND ITS MISSION

1. United Nations Security Council resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by the North Korean forces constituted a breach of peace and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area". In order to better utilize the various offers of assistance and to unify the military operations, the Security Council adopted resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950 requesting Member States providing military forces and other assistance to put them under a unified command headed by the United States of America. Besides the United States, 15 other States Members of the United Nations subsequently provided military forces to the unified command, which was later named the United Nations Command (UNC). Resolution 84 (1950) also requested that the United States provide the Security Council with reports pertaining to the course of action taken by the UNC.

The authority of the UNC under the above Security Council resolutions to conduct military operations in Korea to repel the North Korean armed aggression included the authority to negotiate a military armistice to end the fighting on the basis of United Nations objectives and principles. The Commander-in-Chief, UNC, (CINCUNC) signed the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement on behalf of all the forces of the 16 States Members of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea, which fought under the United Nations banner. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Armistice Agreement, all CINCUNC successors in command are responsible for compliance with the enforcement of the terms and provisions of the Armistice Agreement. The UNC continues to carry out its functions and fulfil its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement, including enforcement of a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces, and maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula until a more permanent peace is achieved by the parties directly concerned. In view of the continued North Korean threat to international peace and stability in the region, UNC confidence-building measures presented at the Military Armistice Commission meetings to reduce military tension, and other significant Armistice-related issues before the Commission, the UNC considers it appropriate to submit the present report to the United Nations Security Council as required by Security Council resolution 84 (1950).

II. ARMISTICE MECHANISM AND PROCEDURES

2. The Korean Armistice Agreement, a purely military agreement between the opposing military commanders, is to ensure a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces of the opposing sides until an enduring bilateral peace-keeping mechanism is established by the two parts of Korea - the two parties directly concerned - to attain a final peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

The term, "opposing forces" includes all ground, naval and air units of both sides. No individual nation or Government is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of the entire military forces under the unified command, consisting of the forces from 16 United Nations Member States, as well as the Republic of Korea. The Commanders of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) signed the Agreement on behalf of the KPA/CPV forces.

A. Military Armistice Commission

3. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in Korea, as established pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, is "to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement". The Commission is a joint international organization and is composed of 10 military members: 5 senior officers from the UNC and 5 senior officers from KPA/CPV. CINCUNC has appointed one member from the United States, two from the Republic of Korea, one from the United Kingdom and one designated on a rotational basis from among the other States Members of the United Nations represented in the UNC by representatives of the rank of Colonel (currently Canada, Colombia, the Philippines and Thailand). MAC meetings are held at the request of either side in the Joint Security Area (JSA), more commonly known as Panmunjom, in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To assist the MAC in fulfilling its functions, the Armistice Agreement provides for a joint secretariat to maintain 24-hour telephone communications between the joint duty officers of each side located in the JSA. The joint duty officers also meet daily, except Sundays and holidays, and serve as the basic channel of communications between the two opposing sides. There have been 453 plenary sessions of the MAC and 497 meetings of the MAC Secretaries since the Armistice Agreement was signed. The MAC, or the Senior Member of either side, is authorized by paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement to dispatch joint observer teams to investigate reported violations of the Armistice Agreement that occur within the DMZ. The KPA/CPV, however, have frustrated this important investigative function by refusing to participate in more than 170 joint investigations proposed by the UNC since April 1967.

B. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

4. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), established by the Korean Armistice Agreement, is composed of four delegations from Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The term "neutral nations" in the Armistice Agreement is defined as nations whose combatant forces did not participate in the Korean conflict. The primary function of NNSC is to conduct independent inspections and investigations of armistice-related developments and violations outside the DMZ and to report its findings to the Commission. Although its basic mission and function of inspection and investigation have been almost completely curtailed owing to KPA/CPV obstruction, NNSC does provide a useful and stabilizing influence in the JSA, as well as a means for indirect communication between the two opposing sides of the MAC. The NNSC holds weekly meetings at Panmunjom.

C. Role of the Republic of Korea

5. A unique feature of the Korean Armistice Agreements is that no nation or Government is a signatory to the Agreement. CINCUNC signed the Armistice Agreement on behalf of the unified command, consisting of the military forces from 16 United Nations Member States and the Republic of Korea. During the Armistice negotiations and afterwards, at the request of the KPA/CPV side, the Government of the Republic of Korea, through the UNC, furnished assurances that it would abide by the Armistice Agreement. Today, the Republic of Korea provides almost all of the "DMZ police" force that maintains security and order in the UNC portion of the DMZ in compliance with the Armistice Agreement. The Republic of Korea's armed forces have complied with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement. In addition, Republic of Korea senior military officers have served on the Military Armistice Commission as UNC members over the last 36 years.

III. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES

6. MAC meetings are normally called to discuss serious violations of the Armistice Agreement and other significant Armistice Agreement-related issues. These meetings, as well as 24-hour telephone communication facilities between the two sides, serve to prevent further escalation of military tension from accidental incidents and possible misunderstanding. Serious charges of Armistice violations are passed telephonically through the Joint Duty Office at Panmunjom. This provides the other side an opportunity to stop ongoing violations. The Commission is a proven means of essential communication between the opposing military commanders, as demonstrated by its continued use by both sides.

7. Eight MAC meetings were held during 1989. The more serious KPA/CPV violations of the Armistice Agreement during the period are described in the appendix to the present report.

Three MAC Secretaries' meetings were held during 1989. Nineteen Chinese war remains as well as five North Korean drowning victims were returned through three MAC Secretaries' meetings. The North Korean side has continued to misuse the MAC as a forum for disseminating distorted political propaganda and for presenting non-Armistice-related political overtures clearly outside the purview of MAC and the Korean Armistice Agreement, thereby subverting the true purpose of the Commission and converting it into a propaganda forum.

8. During 1989, KPA/CPV reiterated its usual demand that the UNC cease its annual training exercise "Team Spirit" and presented non-Armistice-related proposals such as establishment of a nuclear-free zone, cessation of all major military exercises, and tripartite talks. These North Korean political overtures are completely outside the purview of the Armistice Agreement and the MAC. However, the UNC continued its search for measures, acceptable to both sides, which would help build mutual confidence, thereby easing military tension on the Korean peninsula. The most noteworthy are proposals for mutual prior notification of major military exercises and exchange of observers. The UNC has taken unilateral actions in this

regard for the past eight years by notifying the North Koreans of its annual training exercise "Team Spirit" and extending the Republic of Korea government invitations to North Korean, Chinese, and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission military officers to come to observe these training exercises. Unfortunately, the North Koreans rejected these invitations, while expressing their concern that these exercises are offensive in nature and are liable to lead to actual war. (The appendix to the present report discusses in detail more serious KPA/CPV violations of the Armistice Agreement, as well as specific UNC confidence-building measures designed to reduce military tensions.)

IV. CONCLUSIONS

9. For more than 36 years, the MAC has served as the only official channel of communication between the opposing military commanders in Korea. Its most positive aspect is that it is still operative and used by the two opposing military commanders to defuse serious incidents and prevent the resumption of hostilities as required by the Armistice Agreement. The opposing military commanders, however, have no mandate to resolve political issues, such as the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea or turning the Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty. Therefore, the UNC will continue to perform its important peace-keeping role in the Republic of Korea, particularly in maintaining the Armistice, until an effective and enduring mechanism is established through political dialogue between the two parties directly concerned - the two parts of Korea - to ensure a more durable peace on the Korean peninsula.

Appendix

Major incidents/issues discussed by the Military Armistice Commission (1 January to 31 December 1989)

1. North Korean misuse of the Joint Security Area for political rallies and illegal transit by unauthorized individuals

1. Throughout the months of July and August 1989, the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom - the conference area for the Military Armistice Commission, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and south-north dialogue - was deliberately and repeatedly misused by the North Korean side for political demonstrations. Several hundred visitors sponsored by the North Koreans conducted unruly political rallies on several occasions while North Korean staff officers stood by and, at times, actually participated in the demonstrations. Despite repeated UNC protests, the North Korean side continued to encourage this abuse of the sensitive conference area. Then, on 15 August 1989, in complete disregard of several major provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the North Koreans set a potentially dangerous precedent by unilaterally using the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, as a crossing point from which to send two unauthorized South Korean dissidents across the Military Demarcation Line. The plain language of paragraph 7 of the Armistice Agreement stipulates, "No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the [Joint] Military Armistice Commission". There is no exception to this basic rule, which is designed to preclude any trespassing on or incursions through the DMZ, except when a crossing is agreed to by the Governments of the Republic of Korea and North Korea. This unilateral action was taken by the North Koreans despite repeated UNC objections. This type of disruptive and unlawful activity completely disregards past precedent and agreements, seriously raises the potential for confrontation and even violence in the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, and jeopardizes the ability of the Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to maintain the Korean Armistice. UNC protested against these illegal North Korean activities in the Military Armistice Commission conference area through numerous telephone messages, and at the 450th and 451st MAC meetings, respectively, held on 9 August and 12 September 1989.

2. United Nations Command initiatives

2. Despite the continuing North Korean threat and their use of MAC for distorted political propaganda purposes, the UNC continues to approach meetings of MAC and its subordinate agencies in the positive manner intended by the Armistice Agreement. The UNC has proposed a number of confidence-building measures that would assist in reducing military tensions if taken seriously by the North Koreans. So far, the North Koreans have not responded positively to most of these UNC initiatives.

(a) Mutual notification of and invitation to observe major training exercises

3. Contrary to North Korean accusations, military training exercises per se are not addressed by the Armistice Agreement and, therefore, cannot constitute a violation of that Agreement. In contrast, however, secret exercises, such as those routinely conducted by North Korea, cause genuine concern. The UNC has repeatedly proposed mutual prior notification of major military training exercises and the exchange of observers to preclude possible misunderstandings. To demonstrate its good faith, the UNC provided a prior notification to North Korea on 3 March 1989 that exercise "Team Spirit '89" would be conducted for about two weeks beginning in mid-March 1989. At the same time, the Government of the Republic of Korea invited North Korean and Chinese military representatives and NNSC delegates to come to observe the exercise for themselves, to illustrate that it does not pose a threat to North Korea or heighten tensions on the Korean peninsula. At the 447th MAC meeting, on 18 March 1989, the UNC pointed out that military forces throughout the world regularly conduct training exercises, and that there is nothing in the Armistice Agreement about training exercises and, furthermore, that our annual training exercise "Team Spirit", being conducted for the fourteenth consecutive year, well south of the DMZ, on an east-west axis, poses absolutely no threat to North Korea or anyone else. North Korea again rejected this year the Republic of Korea government invitation to come to observe the training exercise. North Korea's continued military build-up, forward deployment of offensively oriented forces, and secret major military manoeuvres all directed against the Republic of Korea, cause serious concern that North Korea may be preparing for another act of armed aggression - all of which serves to make the UNC and the Republic of Korea training exercise even more important as a deterrent to war. The UNC has reminded the North Koreans of unilateral notification of exercise "Team Spirit" for the past seven years to preclude unnecessary misunderstanding. The UNC pointed out that prior notification and invitation to observe military exercises are widely recognized throughout the world as signs of good faith and confidence building. Such positive measures are practised today in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries with great success, and Czechoslovakia has provided its 1989 military exercise calendar to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It would certainly contribute to the reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula if North Korea were to adopt the practice of the UNC and the Republic of Korea and provide prior notification of major military exercises that they conduct.

(b) Confidence-building measures

4. Throughout 1989, the Senior Member, UNCMAC, addressed important Armistice-related confidence-building measures, such as restoration of the Joint Observer Team to investigate serious Armistice violations, establishment of mutual confidence-building measures for exercises including prior notification and observation, removal of propaganda signs in the DMZ, returning the DMZ into a true buffer zone and establishment of a viable vertification system for Armistice compliance in both the DMZ and the Joint Security Area, Panmunjom. At every MAC meeting held during 1989, the Senior Member, UNCMAC, repeatedly called upon the North Korean side to take actions to reduce military tension by responding to UNC confidence-building measures as outlined above.

3. UNC remains issue

5. Paragraph 20 of the "Understanding" on the return of Korean War military remains - a 1954 subsequent agreement - stipulates "in the event that either side discovers in its territory bodies of military personnel belonging to the other side after the termination of this understanding, the delivery and reception of such bodies shall be arranged through the Secretaries of both sides of the Military Armistice Commission". Each side is, therefore, legally obligated to return all military remains that are discovered in accordance with the aforesaid subsequent agreement.

6. On 2 February 1988, the North Korean MAC Secretary officially informed the UNC that North Korea had the remains of two UNC soldiers, specifically Jack J. Sanders and Arthur L. Seaton, both members of the United States Army "among the remains of the United States Army men" in their possession. On the same date, North Korea also publicly admitted through a Korean Central News Agency radio broadcast that North Korea had these remains in its possession. However, with complete disregard for its obligations under the subsequent understanding on the return of Korean War remains, North Korea has not delivered these UNC (United States) remains, citing reasons totally unrelated to North Korean obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

7. At four MAC meetings held during 1989, the UNC reminded the North Korean side of its humanitarian and Armistice Agreement obligations to return these UNC Korean War remains that it has publicly admitted it is holding, and stated this would be a very easy, unilateral confidence-building measure on their part.

Annex II

Special report of the United Nations Command to the United Nations Security Council on the North Korean construction of another infiltration tunnel across the Military Demarcation Line in the DMZ

1. The United Nations Command (UNC) was created in response to United Nations Security Council resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950. In that resolution, the Security Council recommended the establishment of a unified command, under the United States of America, in order to repel North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea and to restore peace and security. It also requested the UNC "provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the unified command". The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), signed the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of this Agreement, all UNC successors in command are responsible for compliance with, and enforcement of, the terms and provisions of the Agreement. Your attention is invited to the 10 May 1989 CINCUNC report to the United Nations Security Council (S/20622) for further information on the role of the unified command involving the Korean Armistice. The UNC continues to carry out its functions and fulfil its obligations under the mandate of the Armistice Agreement to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula until a more permanent peace is achieved by the parties directly concerned.

2. This report summarizes North Korean intransigence on the investigation of a major, serious Armistice violation, i.e., a fourth infiltration tunnel within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea. The lack of progress on joint investigations of Armistice violations is due solely to the North's refusal to co-operate or even discuss such investigations.

(a) On 3 March 1990, an illegal North Korean infiltration tunnel, the fourth one, constructed across the Military Demarcation Line under the DMZ was intercepted by the United Nations Command/Republic of Korea at 38 19'10" north latitude and 128 06'50" east longitude. Apparently, the entrance to the tunnel is within the North Korean portion of the Demilitarized Zone. The tunnel is about two metres high and two metres wide, and more than 145 metres below the surface in solid granite. It extends over 1,000 metres into the UNC portion of the DMZ. This is the fourth time that North Korea has been exposed constructing illegal infiltration tunnels under the DMZ, in violation of paragraphs 1, 6, 13a, 14 and 17 of the Armistice Agreement. (Regarding the first and second North Korean infiltration tunnels, discovered in 1974 and 1975, see the 1975 UNC report (S/11861), and regarding the third North Korean infiltration tunnel, discovered in 1978, see the 1979 UNC report (S/13113).)

(b) The UNC proposed, on three occasions, that a Joint Observer Team (JOT), composed of the UNC and Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers members, meet to investigate jointly the fourth North Korean infiltration tunnel, as provided for by paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Armistice Agreement. The UNC proposals for a joint investigation were completely ignored by the North Korean side,

however, in a gross violation of paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement. At the 455th Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting, held on 14 March 1990, the UNC Senior Member charged the North Koreans with the construction of the fourth infiltration tunnel in serious violation of the Armistice Agreement and presented compelling evidence against the North Koreans that had been gathered by a UNC multinational investigative team. The UNC also pointed out the North Korean failure to abide by the Armistice Agreement when they repeatedly failed to respond to the UNC proposals to dispatch a Joint Observer Team to investigate the fourth North Korean infiltration tunnel.

(c) After denying it existed, and after ignoring three previous UNC proposals to investigate jointly the fourth North Korean infiltration tunnel, the North Korean Senior Member abruptly made a unilateral demand concerning the tunnel at the 455th MAC meeting. The North demanded that the UNC Senior Member sign a "safety guarantee paper" for a 60-man North Korean team that would travel immediately by four North Korean helicopters, flying across the Military Demarcation Line into the UNC portion of the DMZ to conduct an investigation of the tunnel. The North also demanded the UNC Senior Member accompany the North Korean delegation, but made no mention of UNC participation in the investigation. Such an abrupt and unilateral demand is completely contrary to the existing rules and procedures for joint investigations established by the Armistice Agreement and its subsequent agreements. The Armistice Agreement calls for the MAC Secretaries to arrange the dispatch of a Joint Observer Team to conduct a joint investigation of violations reported to have occurred in the DMZ. (See the appendix to the present report on the Armistice Agreement provisions pertaining to the Joint Observer Team investigations.) Nevertheless, UNC welcomed the North Korean counterproposal as "encouraging", agreed to it "in principle", and promised to respond promptly.

(d) On 17 March 1990, the UNC reaffirmed its agreement with the 14 March 1990 North Korean counterproposal, at the same time proposing the 498th MAC Secretaries' meeting be held on 21 March 1990 to arrange the dispatch of a Joint Observer Team to investigate the tunnel. However, on 20 March 1990, the North Koreans rejected the UNC proposal, and simply reiterated their unilateral demands that were first presented at the 455th MAC Secretaries' meeting.

(e) On 26 March 1990, the UNCMAC Senior Member wrote the enclosed letter to his North Korean counterpart. It thoroughly refutes North Korean distortions involving a joint investigation of Armistice Agreement violations, and urges North Korea once more to join the UNC in making the MAC more productive by adhering to Armistice Agreement provisions for Joint Observer Team investigations. On 27 March 1990, the North Korean Senior Member responded, insisting that the UNC must agree to all their unilateral demands presented at the 455th MAC meeting on 14 March 1990 before coming to the Secretaries' meeting proposed by the UNC. In his 27 March response, the North Korean Senior Member dropped any reference to the terms "Joint Observer Team" or a "joint investigation" as defined in the Armistice Agreement, and instead started emphasizing the need for a unilateral investigation by a "large-scale" North Korean "fact-finding group" consisting of 60 North Koreans. They know that if a joint investigation of the fourth tunnel is conducted by a Joint Observer Team in the UNC portion of the DMZ they will have to open up the North Korean portion of the DMZ for reciprocal joint investigations.

(f) On 10 April 1990, the UNC again proposed the 498th MAC Secretaries' meeting be held, and provided an agenda for the meeting. We stated that the UNC would discuss the administrative and technical details involving investigation of the fourth North Korean tunnel. The North Koreans again rejected the UNC's proposal by deliberately imposing unilateral and unacceptable conditions to the convocation of the Secretaries' meeting.

3. Of 16 United Nations Member States that provided military forces to UNC, eight United Nations Member States are still represented in the UNC today. They are Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Officers from these United Nations Member States not only participate in the meetings of the MAC, but also participate in multinational investigations of Armistice violations, such as was the case in the fourth North Korean infiltration tunnel violation.

4. The UNC reaffirms its readiness, consistent with the provisions of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to maintain the Korean Armistice and preserve peace and security on the Korean peninsula until a more durable peace is achieved by the parties directly involved in the Korean question.

Appendix I

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96301-0032

26 March 1990

Major General Choe Ui Ung
Korean People's Army
Senior Member
Korean People's Army and
Chinese People's Volunteers Side
Military Armistice Commission

This letter is to again propose that your side join the United Nations Command in making the Military Armistice Commission and its subordinate agencies more productive in preserving and implementing the Korean truce, as intended by the Armistice Agreement.

Following our breakthrough into your infiltration tunnel No. 4 on 3 March 1990, the United Nations Command proposed that Joint Observer Team No. 5 meet in the vicinity of MDL Marker No. 1074 at 1100 hours, 6 March, to conduct a joint investigation, in accordance with paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Armistice Agreement. The evidence gathered by a UNC multinational investigative team indicated that your side was responsible for the construction of the tunnel under the DMZ. The United Nations Command's request for a joint investigation was to ensure that a proper report of a serious truce violation would be provided to the Commission. Your side, however, in gross violation of paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement, totally ignored three written proposals for a joint investigation.

Then an incredible series of actions occurred. First, on 6 March 1990, your Armed Forces Ministry made an outright denial that you built and maintained tunnel No. 4.

Secondly, after ignoring three proposals to jointly investigate tunnel No. 4, and denying it existed, you abruptly counterproposed an investigation at the 455th MAC meeting, on 14 March 1990, making unilateral demands that the UNCMAC Senior Member sign a "safety guarantee paper" to ensure the safety of four North Korean helicopters and 60 North Korean personnel, including yourself, your Joint Observer Team (JOT) members, other assistants, as well as the press representatives, so that they could immediately cross the MDL into our portion of the DMZ and proceed to the tunnel site. Despite the obvious complexity and perplexing logic of your counterproposal, we welcomed it as "very encouraging", agreed to it "in principle", and promised to respond in a timely way.

/...

Thirdly, following the MAC meeting, your Government deliberately and completely distorted the truth by stating: "The United States side, however, refused to accept our proposal, making it impossible to make an overall investigation into the tunnel ...." Of course, at no time has the United Nations Command rejected your counterproposal, even though it contains a unilateral demand that is outside the framework of the Korean truce.

On 17 March 1990, after careful study of your counterproposal, we responded favourably. The United Nations Command reconfirmed its agreement with your 14 March counterproposal, at the same time proposing the 498th MAC Secretaries' meeting be held on 21 March to discuss the execution of the investigation and the details involving the composition of the Joint Observer Team, technical experts, security personnel, personal safety, transportation, and other necessary arrangements, as described in the agreed-upon JOT rules. Our intent was, and is, to restore the JOT function as prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

Your side, however, on 20 March rejected our proposal for the 498th MAC Secretaries' meeting, and continued misstating and distorting the issue by again insisting the UNC had refused your counterproposal.

The damage you have done to the MAC mechanism is serious. Not only have you refused to participate in JOT investigations as called for by the Armistice Agreement and its subsequent agreements, but you have also refused to attend a numbered MAC Secretaries' meeting to discuss the details involving your counterproposal to dispatch a Joint Observer Team.

Let me cite a precedent where your side proposed that the MAC Secretaries arrange the dispatch of a JOT to conduct a joint investigation. At the 11th MAC meeting, on 13 August 1953, the United Nations Command Senior Member proposed that the Military Armistice Commission dispatch Joint Observer Team No. Nine "to make a complete investigation" of the KPA construction of a fortification in the DMZ. Your side's Senior Member responded: "With reference to the specific joint investigation, I propose it will be arranged by the secretaries of both sides." The UNC Senior Member agreed, the investigation took place, and a report was subsequently filed. A week later, at the 12th MAC meeting on 19 August, the KPA/CPV Senior Member remarked that according to the joint report, the UNC allegation was not proven and, therefore, the case was closed. The UNC Senior Member agreed to that, too.

If your interest in pursuing a joint investigation is genuine, your side should have accepted our call for a MAC Secretaries' meeting, in accordance with the 18 July 1955 subsequent agreement on JOT operations. Instead, you complained that our proposal did not address the size of a joint investigative team, the question of employing appropriate experts, procedures to ensure safety, and the use of four helicopters to transport 60 personnel from your side into the southern portion of the DMZ.

We still consider a MAC Secretaries' meeting to be the best forum to reach necessary agreements in the following areas:

- Number of personnel. Each side provides a number of personnel, which will include two to three accredited JOT members, technical personnel necessary to the operation of the Joint Observer Team, such as explosive ordinance disposal personnel "investigation experts", and press representatives to report on the JOT investigation. (Your proposal was for 60 from your side. The 18 July 1955 subsequent agreement on JOT operations provides for as many as 30 necessary assistants to support a JOT investigation; and the 16 September 1953 subsequent agreement authorizes 100 accredited press representatives from each side to cover such activities.)

- Transportation. Your side requested transport of your personnel by properly marked helicopters flying across the MDL from the north to the south into the UNC portion of the DMZ, to get to the southern side of the tunnel site. For operational and safety reasons, radio frequencies, altitude, direction of flights, and time of flights in and out of the DMZ need to be determined and agreed to.

- Safety. The UNC will provide assurances, in writing if necessary, for the safety of all KPA/CPV personnel and helicopters entering the UNC portion of the DMZ in conjunction with the investigation.

- Senior Members. If desired, the UNC Senior Member will meet the KPA/CPV Senior Member at the tunnel site.

In sum, your side should not reject meetings of Military Armistice Commission subordinate agencies, such as the JOT and numbered MAC Secretaries meetings; to do so fractures the MAC mechanism itself, which is vital to the maintenance of the Korean Armistice. If you are serious about conducting a joint investigation of the infiltration tunnel, it is not too late for your side to agree to a MAC secretaries' meeting to negotiate possible agreements to the areas outlined above. We await your positive response.

Larry G. VOGT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Senior Member
United Nations Command
Military Armistice Commission

/...

Appendix II

APPENDIX TO SPECIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND PERTINENT EXTRACTS FROM THE MILITARY ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

1. Glossary of terms. The following definitions are provided to facilitate an understanding of the UNC report.

(a) MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE (MDL). A line extending for 151 miles across the Korean peninsula which separates North and South Korea. This was the actual line of contact between opposing forces at the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953. It is marked by 1,292 intermittently spaced MDL markers printed in Korean and English on the side facing south and Korean and Chinese on the side facing north.

(b) DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ). The Demilitarized Zone winds 151 miles across the Korean peninsula from the Han River Estuary in the west to a point just below the 39th parallel on the east coast. Down the centre of the 4,000 metre-wide strip is the MDL. The Armistice Agreement created the "DMZ" as a buffer zone and required withdrawal of all military equipment and forces.

(c) JOINT OBSERVER TEAM (JOT). A team composed of not less than four nor more than six officers of field grade rank, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, UNC, and half of whom shall be appointed by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as explosive ordnance disposal personnel, ammunition experts, surveying personnel, drivers etc., shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

2. Pertinent paragraphs and extracts from the "Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a Military Armistice in Korea" (signed at Panmunjom, Korea, 27 July 1953).

PARAGRAPH 1 "A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

PARAGRAPH 6 "Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

PARAGRAPH 7 "No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

PARAGRAPH 8 "No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

PARAGRAPH 9 "No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

PARAGRAPH 11 "Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission ...

PARAGRAPH 12 "The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed.

PARAGRAPH 13 "In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

"a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission ...

PARAGRAPH 26 "The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

PARAGRAPH 27 "The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission."

Appendix III

REVISED GENERAL RULES FOR THE CONTROL, ORGANIZATION, OPERATION AND SUPPORT OF THE JOINT OBSERVER TEAMS*

1. Control

a. Operational control of the Joint Observer Team shall be exercised by the Military Armistice Commission through the Secretaries appointed by both sides.

b. The Military Armistice Commission, or the Senior Member of each side, shall dispatch Joint Observer Teams through the Secretaries appointed by both sides.

2. Organization

a. Five (5) Joint Observer Teams shall be established and the teams separately numbered from ONE to FIVE.

b. Each side shall furnish, to each of such teams, two (2) or three (3) field grade officers and not more than thirty (30) necessary staff assistants and working personnel.

c. Technical personnel necessary to the operation of each Joint Observer Team, such as explosive ordnance disposal personnel, ammunition experts, surveying personnel, photographers, drivers, etc., shall be provided respectively by each side within the total number of staff assistants and working personnel as provided for in the above paragraph.

3. Deployment

a. The Han River Estuary shall constitute area number ONE. The Demilitarized Zone shall be divided into four (4) areas, numbered from TWO through FIVE. Each Joint Observer Team shall perform the mission as provided for in paragraph 26 of the Armistice Agreement in the correspondingly numbered area.

b. Upon the suggestion of the Secretary of either side, boundaries of the numbered area, both in the Han River Estuary and in the Demilitarized Zone, may be adjusted through negotiation as accessibility, terrain features and other considerations of operational conveniences may require.

c. The two components of the Joint Observer Teams shall billet in the territory under the military control of their respective sides, but at locations from which they can readily reach their respective areas in the Han River Estuary

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* Revised rules agreed to by UNC and KPA/CPV at the 135th Secretaries' meeting, 18 July 1955, and approved language versions exchanged via Joint Duty Officers, 26 July 1955.

or the Demilitarized Zone. The teams may be dispatched from the billeting locations to the specific areas of their assignment or to any other areas in the Han River Estuary or the Demilitarized Zone. Teams billeted in or adjacent to assigned areas are not to be considered as dispatched.

4. Methods and procedure of operation

a. The functions of the Teams shall be performed jointly by the team members of both sides.

b. Teams shall meet at times and places mutually agreed upon by the senior team members of both sides, or at times and places directed by the Military Armistice Commission.

c. Teams are not to be considered as dispatched when they perform routine duties.

d. While investigating reported violations of any provisions of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and the Han River Estuary, team members of the two sides shall have equal opportunity to collect facts and listen to the testimonies of the witnesses.

5. Reports

a. Reports shall be made after a Joint Observer Team has been dispatched to investigate violations of the Armistice Agreement, in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Armistice Agreement, after directed to participation in any joint activity, or when deemed necessary by the individual teams. Reports shall be made in the appropriate forms indicated in Annex 1 and Annex 2.

b. Reports of a Joint Observer Team shall be made in accordance with the following procedure:

(1) Prior to the preparation of a report, personnel from the two components of the Team shall meet and, through discussion, ascertain fully and clearly all the facts and points upon which the two components are in agreement and those with respect to which disagreement exists.

(2) Each of the components shall then separately draft, in the one of the three (3) official languages with which it is most familiar, its report in which it shall set forth:

(a) All the facts and points upon which agreement has been reached.

(b) The component's view upon the facts and points not agreed upon.

(3) Each component shall next transmit promptly to the Military Armistice Commission, by telephone, radio, telegraph or other means of rapid communication, the material contents of its report.

(4) Reports of each component will be prepared in four (4) copies, each of which will be signed by its senior member and distributed as follows:

Two (2) forwarded promptly to the Military Armistice Commission, one (1) delivered to the other component of the Team and one (1) retained in the files of the originating component.

(5) Each component shall also retain in its files the one (1) copy received of the report of the other component upon the same subject.

6. Logistic support

a. Members of both sides on a Joint Observer Team shall be logistically supported by their own side at their billeting locations.

b. In addition to billeting and logistically supporting his members of the Joint Observer Teams, each Commander shall furnish all equipment and supplies required by them, including transportation means and communication services.

7. Amendment

Provisions herein, if found to be inappropriate after tentative application, may, upon the suggestion of the Secretary of either side, be amended through negotiation between the Secretaries of the two sides.